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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Free Exercise of
Religion-Trial Court Allowed to Bar the Wearing
of Clerical Collar by Priest-Attorney in Jury Trial
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Petitioner, a Roman Catholic priest' and practicing attorney,2
brought suit to prohibit the respondent, a New York City Criminal
Court judge, from ordering petitioner to remove his clerical collar 3
before appearing as defense counsel in a jury trial.4 Petitioner contended that the order to remove his collar infringed his right to free
exercise of religion 5 guaranteed by the first amendment.' Petitioner
argued that his religious freedom could not be abridged absent the
showing of a compelling state interest.7 Maintaining that the state's
interest could have been accomplished by the less restrictive alternative of voir dire,8 petitioner insisted that the compelling interest
test had not been met.9 Respondent claimed that the state's interest
in providing a fair trial to all litigants outweighed petitioner's right
to wear his religious insignia while arguing before a jury. The Criminal Term of the New York Supreme Court"0 granted petitioner's
1. Petitioner had been an ordained priest for twenty-five years prior to the filing of this
suit.
2. Petitioner was admitted to the New York State Bar in 1973 and was employed by
the Brooklyn Criminal Court Office of the Legal Aid Society's Criminal Justice Division.
3. Petitioner stated that his bishop had "designated" that he practice law as a Catholic
priest and thus wear his clerical garb at all times. He wore his clerical collar throughout law
school, at his appearance before the New York State Bar Committee on Character and
Fitness, at his admission to the Bar, and at all previous court appearances. The proceeding
in question was petitioner's first occasion to serve as counsel in a jury trial.
4. Petitioner's client was charged with commission of a misdemeanor in an alleged
assault upon her child's schoolteacher. People v. Daniels, No. K 324146/1973 (Kings County
Crim. Ct.).
5. Petitioner contended that the wearing of his clerical collar constituted a continuing
act of worship.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ..
7. See note 31 infra.
8. Petitioner asserted that voir dire, the traditional means by which jury prejudice is
minimized, could be utilized to preserve a fair trial in that the particular biases of potential
jurors could be grounds for exclusion from empanelment. This means of preventing jury
prejudice obviously would not infringe upon petitioner's constitutional right to free exercise
of religion.
9. Petitioner raised two other arguments. He contended that the court's order barring
him from trial until he removed his clerical collar violated his client's right to counsel of her
choosing and his own right to practice law.
10. LaRocca v. Lane, 77 Misc. 2d 123, 353 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Crim. T. 1974).
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application for an order in the nature of a prohibition;" the Appellate Division reversed." On appeal the State of New York Court of
Appeals held, affirmed. A state court's order barring an attorney
from wearing his clerical collar as an ordained priest while representing his client before a jury is a proper exercise of the state's
power to guarantee a fair trial to all litigants and does not violate
the priest's right to free exercise of religion. LaRocca v. Lane, 37
N.Y.2d 575, 338 N.E.2d 606, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1975), petition for
cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3429 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1976).
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The first amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion, although couched in absolute terms, has never been considered an
absolute right. The first significant free exercise case, Reynolds v.
United States,'3 upheld the conviction of a Mormon polygamist who
claimed a religious exemption from the bigamy laws on the basis of
the first amendment. 4 The Court held that while Congress was left
powerless to legislate in matters of mere opinion, it was nonetheless
"left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order."' 5
Subsequent free exercise cases often utilized an approach similar to the Reynolds case. The courts repeatedly asserted that, although the right to religious freedom was a "preferred" one'6 in the
constitutional hierarchy, the freedom to act out of religious conviction was subject to reasonable governmental regulation. After the
free exercise clause was applied to the states in Cantwell v.
Connecticut," state courts exhibited this same analysis. As a consequence, even substantial free exercise claims seldom were upheld
throughout much of this century.' 8 For example, state regulations
designed to protect public health and safety almost always survived
free exercise challenges. Faith healers were successfully prosecuted
11. The Criminal Term found that no jury bias could be presumed from petitioner's
appearance in his clerical collar and that the effective use of voir dire could prevent the
possibility of jury prejudice.
12. 47 App. Div. 2d 243, 366 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1975).
13. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
14. The Court noted that the Mormon church imposed upon its male members a duty
to marry several women and procreate in order to bring more souls into the church.
15. 98 U.S. at 164.
16. The "preferred" status of the free exercise clause was first articulated in footnote 4
of Chief Justice Stone's opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938).
17. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
18. Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise
Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1234.
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for practicing medicine without a license"9 and individuals were convicted for not submitting to compulsory vaccination despite their
religious objections to such medical treatment."0 In an unusual case,
the preacher of a snake-handling religious group was prosecuted for
manslaughter after his wife, also a member of the sect, died from
snake bite.' Other governmental interests of varying importance
also defeated free exercise claims. Mormons continued to serve sentences for commission of bigamy,2" and Jehovah's Witnesses were
convicted under child labor laws for allowing their children to sell
religious literature.23
The concession to colorable state interests is apparent in the
1961 Supreme Court decision of Braunfeld v. Brown. 4 A Jewish
merchant challenged state Sunday closing laws as a violation of his
right to free exercise of religion. The merchant contended that he
could not maintain his business and his belief in abstaining from
work on the Jewish Sabbath if he were forced to close his shop on
Sunday. The Court cited the Reynolds action-belief distinction and
held that since the closing law was enacted to further a legitimate
state interest, the regulation would be valid "unless the State
[might] accomplish its purpose by means which [did] not impose
such a burden. 125 The Court, nevertheless, found no alternative
means of guaranteeing a day of rest to the state's citizenry.28 Justice
Brennan in dissent applied the same test as did the majority of the
Court to achieve the opposite result. He noted that the state might
have granted plaintiff an exemption to the closing law without sacrificing its goal of providing a day of rest and reasoned that the failure
of the state to choose this less burdensome method was a fatal
constitutional flaw.
A striking change in the free exercise standard was introduced
in Sherbert v. Verner,2 an opinion authored by Justice Brennan.
19. People v. Handzik, 410 Ill. 295, 102 N.E.2d 340 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927
(1952).
20. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
21. Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 44 S.E.2d 409 (1947). See also Hill v. State,
38 Ala. App. 404, 88 So. 2d 880, cert. denied, 264 Ala. 697, 88 So. 2d 887 (1956); Lawson v.
Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942).
22. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
23. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
24. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
25. Id. at 607.
26. Plaintiffs suggested that an exception for Sabbatarians could be carved out of the
closing law without damaging the state's interest in creating a day of rest. The Court noted
that many (21 of 34 states having Sunday closing laws) states had created statutory exemptions for religious groups, apparently without deleterious effects to the system. Nevertheless,
the Court held that it was not concerned with the "wisdom of legislation." Id. at 608.
27. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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Although the Court was careful to note that it was not overruling
Braunfeld, two Justices 8 dissented because they felt that Braunfeld
in fact was being discarded. The plaintiff in Sherbert was a Seventh
Day Adventist who was denied unemployment compensation under
a South Carolina statute 9 because she refused to take an available
job that required work on Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith."
In upholding the plaintiff's claim that the South Carolina unemployment law violated her right to free exercise of religion, the Court
held that the state must justify any infringement upon religious
liberty by a compelling state interest.3 1 The Court's pronouncement
of the importance of religious freedom was not new, but the scrutiny
given the state's interest was unique. South Carolina advanced the
legitimate objective of protecting its unemployment fund from
fraudulent claims. The Court, however, held that the mere possibility of fraudulent claims by feigned objections to Saturday work was
insufficient to override plaintiff's free exercise claim, stating:
[E]ven if the possibility of spurious claims did threaten to dilute the fund and
disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat
abuses without infringing First Amendment rights.32

The trend of stricter scrutiny for state regulations that limit
religious liberty continued in the recent decision of Wisconsin v.
Yoder,33 an attack by Amish parents on a Wisconsin compulsory
school attendance statute. 4 While agreeing that plaintiffs' religious
28. Justices Harlan and White filed the dissenting opinion. Id. at 418.
29. S.C. CODE tit. 68, §§ 68-1 to -404. This statute required that any applicant for

unemployment compensation not have failed, without good cause, to apply for or to accept
available work.
30. Plaintiff had worked at a textile mill; she terminated her employment when the mill
began to require Saturday work. Plaintiff then applied for work at several other mills in her
area, but all plants required Saturday work.
31. Mr. Justice Brennan first distinguished the case from the public health and safety
decisions in which the free exercise claim had posed a serious threat to public welfare:
Plainly enough, appellant's conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes no
conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach of state legislation.
If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise,
or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be
justified by a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate....
374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
32. 374 U.S. at 407.
33. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
34. Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (1969). This statute requires all children between the ages of
seven and sixteen to attend public school. The Amish community objects to public schooling
beyond the eighth grade.
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objections to public schooling past the eighth grade were sincere, 35
the Court found that the state also had an interest in providing
compulsory public education to develop responsible, self-sufficient
citizens. The Court resolved the issue by examining the barrierto
state objectives that would flow from recognizing an exception to
the regulation for those of Amish faith. Noting that the Amish were
a capable, self-supporting group of citizens, the Court held that any
impediment to the state's goal of producing self-reliant individuals
would be minimal. The plaintiffs' right to free exercise of religion
thus was held to outweigh the state interest.
Decisions in state and federal courts since the articulation of
the strict scrutiny standard in Sherbert have attempted to apply the
principles laid down by the Supreme Court with varying results.
Most courts no longer will accept untested assertions that the state's
interest will be undermined by religious exemption to state regulation. Such courts examine the religious belief only to determine if
it is sincere,3" and then scrutinize the state's regulation to determine
whether it furthers a compelling state interest. Many free exercise
claims have been upheld under this new analysis. For example, in
one of the first cases decided after Sherbert, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a criminal contempt conviction for failure to
serve on a jury because of religious objections.17 The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the contempt conviction of a criminal
defendant who refused to remove his filaas (religious head-covering)
at his arraignment." Moreover, the California Supreme Court has
allowed an exemption from its drug regulations for members of the
Native American Church, a group that uses peyote in its religious
ceremonies.31
Several courts, however, have denied free exercise claims on the
ground that the state interests asserted met the Sherbert require35. The Court noted that the plaintiffs believed that children must be instructed at
home during impressionable teenage years to maintain a detachment from the world, a
requirement of the Amish religion.
36. The Court in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), held that while the truth
of religious beliefs may not be placed on trial, the sincerity of such beliefs may be examined.
37. In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588, rev'g 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515,
vacated & remanded, 375 U.S. 14 (1963). Defendant's religious objection to jury duty was
based on the Biblical directive "Judge not, so you will not be judged," Matthew 7:1 (rev.
stand. ver.) 265 Minn. at 97, 120 N.W.2d at 516.
38. McMillan v. State, 258 Md. 147, 265 A.2d 453 (1970). Defendant stated at trial that
he was a member of a religious sect known as Ujamma, which had originated in Tanzania.
Defendant testified that his religion required that he wear his head-covering whenever confronted by oppressors and that he felt that all white persons in America were oppressors of
the black race. 258 Md. at 154, 265 A.2d at 457.
39. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
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ments. In People v. Woodruff,40 the New York Appellate Division
upheld a criminal contempt conviction for failure to testify before
a grand jury since the state had a compelling interest in procuring
defendant's testimony.4 1 The Arkansas Supreme Court in Wright v.
DeWitt School District42 held that the state's interest in promoting
public health was so compelling that plaintiff could not be exempted from compulsory vaccination even though there had been
no smallpox reported in the county for fifty years. Others courts
have not applied the Sherbert standard expressly but arguably have
found that state regulations would meet the compelling interest
standard. Thus the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals sustained
a conviction for marijuana use in allegedly religious ceremonies because "there is no possible justification for the use of [marijuana]
'4
in the name of religious freedom.
The problem remains difficult in close cases where a valid invocation of the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom conflicts
with a substantial state objective. The instant decision, one such
case, represents an attempt to weigh a free exercise claim against
the state's interest in the unbiased functioning of its jury system.
IlI. THE INSTANT OPINION
The instant court" began its opinion with a lengthy discussion
of whether the writ of prohibition was an appropriate remedy for
preventing the trial court's alleged violation of petitioner's constitutional rights." After determining that prohibition was the proper
remedy to vindicate the "preferred" right to free exercise of religion,
the court decided that such vindication was not necessary on the
instant facts. The court noted that religious practices, unlike reli40.

26 App. Div. 2d 236, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966).

41. Defendant refused to testify at an investigation into narcotics use because her
religion, an unnamed faith similar to Hinduism, prohibited her from causing any person harm
by testifying against him. Experts on Oriental religions testified that devotees of the Hindu
religion held beliefs similar to that asserted by defendant. Id. at 237, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
42.

238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965).

43. Lewellyn v. State, 489 P.2d 511, 516 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
44. Chief Justice Breitel wrote the majority opinion in which all justices except Gabrielli, J., concurred.
45. Normally the correction of litigation errors is a matter handled by standard review
or appeal procedures. The court held that prohibition was available in this case, however, to
prevent the inferior court from acting in excess of its powers. Since petitioner advanced a
substantial claim that the trial court exceeded its powers by violating his constitutional
rights, the writ of prohibition was appropriate, even though the petitioner's claim was denied
on the merits of the case. The court concluded that the petitioner should not be forced to
pursue other available remedies such as contempt proceedings or an appeal in the criminal
case. Such remedies were held to be inadequate because they either were too burdensome to
petitioner or failed to present squarely the significant constitutional issue.
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gious beliefs, are subject to regulations necessary for the protection
of society.
Expressing concern that petitioner's appearance in clerical garb
could prejudice a jury either in favor of" or against47 his client, the
court decided that the guarantee of a fair trial to all litigants was a
state interest of "paramount" importance. The court then balanced
petitioner's free exercise claim against this paramount state interest. The court noted that all lawyers are subject to reasonable dress
regulations in order to preserve order and decorum in the courtroom
and "generally to [further] the administration of justice." The
court also deemed important the need to avoid the "improper displacement of client by attorney" that might be caused by the "idiosyncracies" of an attorney's "dress, appearance, character or status." All these considerations were held to outweigh any incidental
burden" on petitioner's religious liberty.
Although the court cited the compelling interest test set forth
in Sherbert v. Verner, it dismissed Sherbert and other Supreme
Court free exercise cases as "not particularly helpful" because such
cases did not deal with "paramount" state interests such as the
preservation of a fair trial. Finally, the court expressly limited its
opinion to the facts of the instant case. The court emphasized that
its decision had no bearing on whether non-clerical religious practices, symbols, or expressions were permissible in the courtroom.
One justice" dissented from the instant decision on the basis
of the dissenting opinion filed in the Appellate Division.5s The dissenting justice in the Appellate Division voted to hold respondent's
order unconstitutional on the ground that the less restrictive alternative of voir dire should have been utilized before petitioner's religious liberty was abridged.
46. The court noted that since a clergyman "is accorded a measure of respect and trust
unlike that which is given to those of other vocations . . . a juror might ascribe a greater
measure of veracity and personal commitment to the rightness of his client's cause." 37
N.Y.2d at _
338 N.E.2d at 613, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 101 (1975).
47. The court also expressed concern that religious prejudices might extend from the
attorney-priest to his client. The court felt that its duty was to protect the client's right to a
fair trial, even though the client herself expressly had requested that petitioner remain her
defense counsel.
48. The court found that petitioner's wearing of his clerical collar was a requirement of
his religion "not unconditional or beyond dispensation." 37 N.Y.2d at .- 338 N.E.2d at
613, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
, 338
49. Justice Gabrielli filed the dissent in the Court of Appeals. 37 N.Y.2d at
N.E.2d at 613, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
50. Justice Shapiro authored the dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division. 47 App.
Div. 2d 243, 253, 366 N.Y.S.2d 456, 465 (1975).
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COMMENT

The instant opinion is important as a vehicle for reexamination of the confusion in the cases interpreting the free exercise clause. The decision is illustrative of a lower court's struggle
with the free exercise standards set forth by the Supreme Court; its
avoidance of the compelling interest test adopted by the Supreme
Court in Sherbert and affirmed in Yoder is a definite departure from
those standards. The court did not openly reject the compelling
interest standard. Instead, it first decided that the state had a "paramount" interest in assuring a fair trial to all litigants, and after
citing Sherbert's compelling interest test, concluded that the test
was not "helpful" because the interest involved in Sherbertwas not
"paramount." The Supreme Court, however, has determined that
the compelling interest test is the yardstick by which the state's
interest is to be measured.
The distinction between the court's paramount test and the
traditional Supreme Court standard is more than semantic. First of
all, there are many cases that establish whether particular state
interests are compelling; these cases lose their precedential value
under the court's new test. Secondly, the Sherbertstandard imposes
on the court a concomitant duty to find that no alternative form of
regulation will effectuate the state purpose in question without
abridging first amendment rights. Petitioner contended that judicious use of voir dire could serve the same purpose, elimination of
bias, as did the trial court's order. The instant court, however, failed
even to discuss whether voir dire might be a less restrictive alternative to barring petitioner's clerical collar from the courtroom.
It thus seems clear that the court was hesitant to follow the
principles laid down in Sherbert. Admittedly, the compelling interest test, applied in various cases, can lead to unpalatable results.
Under the Sherbertstandard, any state regulation that accidentally
infringes on religious liberty must be justified by a rigorous compelling state interest test. Such a strict scrutiny potentially creates
many claims for exemptions from otherwise legitimate state regulations. Courts will not be adverse to allowing such exceptions when
laws conflict with traditional religious beliefs and practices so wellknown that their sincerity is not apt to be questioned. The cases
that will cause problems involve claims by unconventional religious
groups to exemptions from statutes applicable to the citizenry at
large and in no way designed to interfere with religious liberty. As
otherwise valid regulations are attacked by novel religious sects, it
seems possible that courts will be tempted to find a compelling
interest more readily as the religious belief becomes more far-
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fetched.5' This type of religious scrutiny would be antithetical to the
free exercise clause. The Supreme Court's opinion in Yoder" disclosed the potential for such discrimination between religious
groups. The Court allowed Amish children an exemption from
compulsory education laws only after an extended discussion of the
self-sufficiency of the Amish community.
Given the potential for misapplication of the Sherbert standard, the instant court in rejecting that standard nevertheless fails
to replace the Supreme Court test with a more workable guideline.
The problems that plague the compelling interest standard also
will inhere in the "paramount" criterion because the court failed to
define exactly what is a paramount interest. The flexibility thus
built into the standard allows a court to vary the test according to
its sympathy with the asserted free exercise claim. Additionally,
religious beliefs that traditionally have been accepted as sincere
and "true" will be jeopardized by the creation of a loosely-defined
standard. In the instant case, for example, although the basis for
petitioner's claim was a widely-recognized form of religious expression, the court decided, without closely scrutinizing the state's asserted interest, that the infringement on religious liberty was justified. There was no demonstrated prejudice involved in this case, yet
the court took at face-value the state's contention that a fair trial
was endangered by petitioner's appearance in his clerical collar.
Additionally, it could be argued that, even if "idiosyncracies"
should be eliminated, their existence is inherent in the American
system of trial advocacy. Often unusual traits of attorneys, witnesses or parties may be latent influences on a jury determination,
but such traits are permitted to flourish in the courtroom. Although
the highly visible manifestation of a priest's status may be so obtrusive as to warrant different treatment, the court nevertheless was
remiss in failing even to examine this argument.
Finally, the court ignored petitioner's contention that voir dire
was the least restrictive alternative for eliminating potential juror
bias. This omission is the most drastic departure from the Sherbert
standard and perhaps the most unwarranted. In the instant case,
voir dire was certainly an arguable alternative to the trial court's
order barring petitioner's clerical collar. It is the traditional method
by which factors potentially prejudicial to a jury determination are
reduced or eliminated. The use of the least restrictive alternative
prohibits the state from infringing upon religious freedom when it
51. But see McMillan v. State, 258 Md. 147, 265 A.2d 453 (1970), discussed supra note
38 and accompanying text.
52. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
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could accomplish its goals by means that do not interfere with
constitutional rights. By abandoning the least restrictive alternative, the instant court's opinion would allow a state to abridge religious freedom even when the encroachment could be minimized
without sacrificing the state's legitimate purpose. The first amendment's absolute prohibition seemingly demands that the infringement in this situation be avoided. It thus seems that the court
should have confronted petitioner's voir dire contention.
The present case thus represents a break from the standards set
forth by the Supreme Court to govern decisions in free exercise
cases. This divergence may be designed to avoid problems inherent
in the compelling state interest test. The instant opinion, however,
fails to provide a more workable guideline for such cases and additionally compromises the force of the free exercise clause.
SUSAN

E.

DOMINICK

Constitutional Law-Interstate
Commerce-Federal Regulations Requiring
States to Enact Statutes Enforcing Federal Air
Pollution Control Programs Exceed the Commerce
Power by Intruding Upon State Sovereignty
Protected by the Tenth Amendment
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Petitioners' sought review 2 of transportation control regulations
issued pursuant to section 110(c)(1)1 of the Clean Air Act by the
1. The state of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, the District of Columbia, the
County of Prince William, Virginia, and the Cities of Alexandria and Fairfax, Virginia were
petitioners.
2. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the D.C. Circuit by 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970),
which provides in pertinent part: "A petition for review of the Administrator's action in
approving or promulgating any implementation plan . . . may be filed only in the United
States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit."
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c)(1) (1970). The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970), requires
the Administrator to promulgate national primary air quality standards necessary to protect
public health, and national secondary air quality standards necessary to protect the public
from any known adverse effects. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970). These standards were promulgated on April 30, 1971.40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (1974). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (1970), each
state is responsible for submitting an implementation plan designed to achieve the national
primary and secondary air quality standards that meet the specific criteria in 42 U.S.C. §
1857c-5(a)(2)(A)-(H) (1970). If the state plan is inadequate the Administrator must disapprove the plan and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c)(1) (1970), must promulgate federal
regulations setting forth an implementation plan for the state. Petitioners submitted an
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Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as
part of the implementation plan for the National Capital Interstate
Air Quality Control Region.4 The EPA plan 5 included the requirements that petitioners submit legally adopted regulations implementing programs for vehicle inspections and retrofit, and refuse to
register nonconforming vehicles.' Petitioners asserted that the inherent limitations of federalism embodied in the tenth amendment
prevent the Administrator from requiring states to enforce and administer federal air quality control regulations.' Respondent argued
that congressional authority under the commerce clause9 includes
implementation plan to the EPA in April and May 1973. The Administrator approved some
portions of the plan and disapproved others. The Administrator then proposed his own regulations that, as finally adopted, form the basis of this appeal.
4. The National Capital Interstate Air Quality Control Region consists of Montgomery
and Prince George Counties, Maryland; Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William
Counties, and the cities of Alexandria, Fairfax, and Falls Church in Virginia; and the District
of Columbia.
5. The regulations for the District of Columbia are found at 40 C.F.R. § 52.470-96
(1974); for Maryland at 40 C.F.R. § 52.1070-112 (1974); and for Virginia at 40 C.F.R. §
52.2420-47 (1974). The pertinent transportation controls required in summary:
(1) Purchase of additional buses by 1977, with costs spread over the three jurisdictions.
40 C.F.R. §§ 52.476(g), 52.1080(g), 52.2435(e) (1974).
(2) Creation of reversible bus lanes on specified corridors. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.476(h),
52.1080(h), 52.2435(f) (1974).
(3) A state-created vehicle inspection and maintenance program. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.490,
52.1089, 52.2441 (1974).
(4) Creation of 60 miles of bicycle lanes. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.491, 52.10190, 52.2442 (1974).
(5) Retrofitting of all heavy-duty vehicles and certain medium-duty vehicles with an
Air/Fuel Control Device. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.492, 52.494, 52.1091-92, 52.2444-45 (1974).
(6) Retrofitting of all pre-1968 light-duty vehicles with a Vacuum Spark Advance
Disconnect (VASD). 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.496, 52.1094, 52.2447 (1974).
The plan also contained gasoline vapor recovery regulations and dry cleaning solvent evaporation control regulations not challenged by petitioners. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.487-89, 52.1086-88,
52.2439-440 (1974).
6. The vehicle inspection and retrofit regulations followed a basic pattern:
(a) Definitions.
(b) Application of the regulation to the state's portion of the National Capital Region.
(c) Requirement that the states adopt the necessary statutes and regulations implementing the EPA program.
(d) Submission of the legally adopted regulations by a set date.
(e) Prohibition against state registration of nonconforming vehicles.
(f) Prohibition against the operation of nonconforming vehicles.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. X, which provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
8. Petitioners also asserted that the Administrator did not have statutory authority
under the Clean Air Act to force states to enact the instant regulations; that the regulations
violated the constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government; and that various
portions of the regulations were arbitrary and capricious.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which provides: "The Congress shall have Power ...
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian
Tribes."
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the power to require states to cooperate in achieving national air
quality standards.' 0 On appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit,
held, the regulations affirmed in part and remanded in part to the
EPA. Federal regulations promulgated under the Clean Air Act that
require states to enact statutes enforcing and administering federal
air pollution control plans exceed congressional power under the
commerce clause by drastically intruding on state sovereignty protected by the tenth amendment. District of Columbia v. Train,
521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W.
3439 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1976).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Chief Justice Marshall, in his classic opinion in Gibbons v.
Ogden," declared that congressional power to regulate commerce
was plenary and limited only by other provisions of the Constitution.' 2 The Supreme Court, in opinions subsequent to Gibbons, initially limited the doctrine as set forth by Justice Marshall.' 3 In
recent years, however, in response to labor strife, 4 increased governmental economic regulation,"5 and the civil rights movement,'6 the
10. Respondent also argued that the Clean Air Act authorized him to enact the regulations because under 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(b) (1970) the Administrator may enforce an applicable implementation plan against "any person" in violation of the plan, and 42 U.S.C. §
1857h(e) defines "person" to include states and municipalities. Respondent further contended that Congress intended that states be required to cooperate in the achievement of
national air quality standards. See statement of Congressman Staggers:
If we left it all to the Federal Government, we would have about everybody on the
payroll of the United States. We know this is not practical. Therefore, the Federal
Government sets the standards, we tell the States what they must do and what standards they must meet. These standards must be put into effect by the communities and
the states, and we expect them to have the means to do the actual enforcing.
116 CONG. REc. 19,204 (daily ed. June 10, 1970). See also respondent's Preamble to the
transportation control regulations:
. . .the amendments of 1970 were designed to cure deficiencies that had resulted from
total reliance upon state and local action to solve what was increasingly recognized as a
national health problem. The regulations now being promulgated will provide the necessary assurance that such state and local action will be forthcoming.
38 Fed. Reg. 30633 (1973).
11. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
12. Chief Justice Marshall stated:
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be
governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.
Id. at 196.
13. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918).
14. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
15. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
16. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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Court has sanctioned congressional regulation of nearly any activity, or class of activities, 17 that even remotely affects interstate commerce. Exercise of sweeping regulatory powers by the federal government inevitably conflicts with sovereign powers of state and local
governments."8 The Court's struggle in attempting to preserve a
federalist system of government is illustrated by opinions dealing
with the federal taxing power. Early in its history the Court recognized that if state and federal governments were allowed to tax each
other, the practice could lead to the destruction of both. 9 In 1905,
however, the Court in South Carolinav. United States" limited the
protection afforded to states by characterizing a state-operated liquor monopoly as a "private business" rather than "governmental"
activity and refusing to grant immunity from a federal tax to the
state. 21 Justice Frankfurter, writing a two-judge plurality opinion
in New York v. United States,2 further limited the protection of
states from federal regulation by seemingly abandoning the "governmental" versus "private business" distinction and holding that
a state could not claim immunity from a "non-discriminatory"
federal tax. 23 Frankfurter nevertheless acknowledged that some
state activity, such as maintaining a statehouse, is so intrinsically
a state function that it never could be taxed without unjustifiably
24
interfering with the state's sovereign powers.
State sovereignty has presented less impediment to the exercise
of federal commerce power than it has to the extension of federal
taxing power. The Supreme Court has analyzed the question in two
17. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192-93 (1968) (the only question is whether a
rationally defined class of activities affects interstate commerce).
18. The preemption doctrine determines the extent to which federal regulation of an
activity forecloses state regulation. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520
(1959); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). For a discussion of
the effect of preemption on state environmental legislation see Note, State Environmental
Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1762 (1974).
19. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall described a state's power to tax
as the "power to destroy," 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819), and held that Maryland could
not tax the operations of the National Bank. The same principle later was extended to protect
states from federal taxation. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
20. 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
21. Id. at 461.
22. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
23. Id. at 583-84. Frankfurter considered congressional power to tax no less broad than
congressional power to regulate commerce. Id. at 582.
24. Id. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Stone agreed that the "governmental" and
"proprietary" distinction should be abandoned, but disagreed that state sovereignty adequately could be protected by merely requiring a federal tax to be nondiscriminatory. Stone
contended that the actual interference with state functions must be examined. Id. at 588.
Dissenting, Justices Douglas and Black would have found the state activity protected and
would have overruled South Carolina.Id. at 590.
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ways: (1) whether Congress may regulate intrastate conduct that
affects interstate commerce when a state has chosen to remain inactive; and (2) whether Congress may regulate state activity that if
conducted by an individual would be subject to federal regulation.
The Court considered the first issue in 1941 in United States v.
Darby.25 The Court upheld a Fair Labor Standards Act indictment
of an employer who sold lumber in interstate commerce produced
by employees earning substandard wages. Responding to defendant's claim that the statute contravened the tenth amendment by
regulating intrastate activity, the Court declared that the commerce
power is complete in itself and cannot be diminished by the exercise
or nonexercise of state power.2 6 The Court then described the tenth
amendment as stating but a "truism" that all power is retained that
has not been surrendered.2 7 Five years earlier, in United States v.
California,8 the Court addressed the alternative issue of whether
state conduct is immune from federal commerce regulation. The
Court held that an intrastate railroad, wholly owned and operated
by the state of California, was subject to the federal Safety Appliance Act. Considering petitioner's claim that the state operated the
railroad in a "sovereign" rather than "private" capacity, the Court
noted that the railroad had all the attributes of a private railroad
but dismissed as irrelevant the question whether the state acted in
its sovereign capacity. The Court focused instead on whether the
Safety Appliance Act was a valid exercise of federal commerce
power, 29 holding that once this test is met the activity can be regulated whether conducted by a state or an individual. In the 1968
Maryland v. Wirtz" decision, the Court applied the Californiarationale to Maryland's attack upon an extension of the federal minimum wage law to state school and hospital employees. The Court,
sustaining the extension, found that labor conditions in state institutions had the requisite effect on interstate commerce.' Although
the Court asserted that the federal commerce power could override
countervailing state interests, 32 the Court acknowledged that inherent limitations in the commerce clause gave the Court power to
25. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
26. Id. at 114.
27. Id. at 124.
28. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
29. The Court concluded: "The state can no more deny the power [to regulate commerce] if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an individual." Id. at 185.
30. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
31. Id. at 194.
32. Id. at 195.
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prevent the destruction of states as sovereign political entities.3 3 In
Fry v. United States34 the Court upheld a federal injunction preventing Ohio from raising state employee wages by 10.6% in violation of the 7% ceiling imposed by the President acting pursuant to
the Economic Stablilization Act. Rather than emphasizing the limitations on the federal commerce power, petitioners claimed that the
injunction violated the tenth amendment. The Court found the necessary nexus between state employee wages and interstate commerce, 35 but noted that the Economic Stabilization Act intruded
even less upon state sovereignty than the minimum wage law upheld in Wirtz. 36 The Court also indicated that petitioner's tenth
amendment argument may have substance, stating in a footnote
that the tenth amendment is not "without significance" and reflects
a constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a
fashion that drastically impairs a state's ability to function in a
federal system. 7
While the Court's consideration of conflicts between federal
regulation under the commerce clause and state sovereignty heretofore has been in terms of federal power to regulate private activity
that otherwise could have been regulated by the states, as in Darby,
and federal power to regulate state activity that if conducted by
individuals could be regulated federally, as in California,Wirtz, and
Fry, the Clean Air Act presents the fundamentally different question whether Congress, acting pursuant to the commerce clause, can
compel a state to regulate its own citizens. 8 In 1974 the Third Circuit in Pennsylvania v. EPA39 considered an EPA-imposed implementation plan for the Philadelphia region that included a requirement that the state submit legally adopted regulations establishing
33. Id. at 196. But cf. Murphy v. O'Brien, 485 F.2d 671, 675 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1973) (Wirtz implies that state sovereignty no longer imposes any limit on the authority of
Congress to regulate commerce).
34. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
35. Id. at 547.
36. Id. at 548.
37. The Court stated:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a "truism," stating merely that
"all is retained which has not been surrendered,". . . it is not without significance. The
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise
power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.
Id. at 547 n.7.
38. For a general discussion of federal efforts to fight air pollution see Stevens, Air
Pollution and the FederalSystem: Response to Felt Necessities, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 661 (1971).
39. 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974). For a commentary on the Pennsylvania decision see 53
TEXAS L. REV. 380 (1975).
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a vehicle retrofit program. 0 Pennsylvania argued that the Administrator's alleged authority under section 113(c) of the Clean Air Act
to impose criminal sanctions4 ' against state officials for failure to
submit the regulations exceeded the federal commerce power. Relying on the Wirtz analysis, the court found that transportation systems utilizing highways and automobiles affected interstate commerce and dismissed as irrelevant the assertion that highways, unlike railroads, are uniquely governmental entities.12 The court concluded that Congress could require states to enact measures reducing air pollution caused by the states through their choice of transportation systems,4 3 and upheld the EPA plan. Recently, in Brown
4 5 the Ninth and Fourth Circuits
v. EPA44 and Maryland v. EPA
considered similar EPA plans for California" and Baltimore 7 air
quality control regions. In Brown, the court examined the enforcement sections of the Clean Air Act and held that the Administrator
was not authorized to force states to adopt regulations implementing EPA programs." Although the court explicitly limited the basis
of its holding to statutory interpretation,49 the court felt obligated
to discuss the serious constitutional questions it purposely was
avoiding. The court then expressed grave misgivings about the constitutionality of the EPA plan, noting that the extensions of the
commerce power approved by the Supreme Court in Wirtz and Fry
40. 40 C.F.R. § 52.2039 (1974).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(c)(1) (1970) provides: "Any person who knowingly . . .
[violates an applicable implementation plan] shall be punished by a fine of not more than
$25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both."
42. The court stated: "The Commonwealth cannot, by denominating traffic control and
vehicle registration as 'governmental' activities, immunize them from federal regulation
." 500 F.2d 246, 261 (3d Cir. 1974).
43. Id. In the Preamble to the instant regulations, the Administrator also attributed
automobile pollution to state activity:
By building and maintaining roads and highways, by licensing vehicles and operators,
by providing a system of traffic laws, and in many other ways, government has encouraged the growth of automobile use to its present levels. There is nothing inevitable about
such a choice. Governments could equally well have chosen to discharge their basic
function of maintaining a transportation system in ways that would have discouraged
the use of single-passenger automobiles, and encouraged the use of mass transit. But
often they have not.
38 Fed. Reg. 30632 (1973).
44. 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3380 (U.S. Dec.
24, 1975).
45. 8 ERC 1105 (4th Cir. Sept. 19, 1975), petitionfor cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S.
Jan. 7, 1976).
46. 40 C.F.R. § 52.242 (1974) (the state was required to implement a vehicle inspection
and maintenance program).
47. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.1095-100 (1974).
48. 521 F.2d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 1975).
49. Id. at 836.
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did not involve regulations requiring states to exercise their police
powers. 5 In Maryland,the Fourth Circuit also rejected the Administrator's statutory authority to promulgate the EPA plan,5 ' but similarly felt compelled to comment on the doubtful constitutionality of
the plan, emphasizing that the clearest attribute of state sover'52
eignty is the "right of their legislature to pass, or not to pass, laws.
Despite the fact that the language of the courts in Brown and
Maryland casts doubt on whether Congress has the constitutional
authority to require states to enforce federal air quality control standards, both decisions expressly declined to reach the issue. Thus the
holding of constitutionality in Pennsylvaniaremained the only definitive pronouncement on the issue prior to the instant case.
IXI.

THE INSTANT OPINION

After first determining that the Clean Air Act did not authorize
the Administrator to force states to enact statutes pursuant to a
federally promulgated implementation plan, 53 the court acknowledged a distinction between ordering a state to adopt regulations as
part of a federal plan and ordering a state to enforce federal regulations against vehicles registered by the state. Finding nothing in the
Act specifically rejecting the Administrator's authority to require
states to enforce federal regulations," the court considered whether
Congress constitutionally could regulate states in such a manner.
First, the court found that Congress clearly has authority under the
commerce clause to regulate sources of air pollution, including the
power to require owners of motor vehicles to install air pollution
devices. Secondly, the court found it equally clear that Congress
50. Id. at 838.
51. 8 ERC 1105, 1114 (4th Cir. Sept. 19, 1975).
52. Id. at 1112.
53. The court stated that the Administrator did not have authority under 42 U.S.C. §
1857c-5(a)(1) (1970) to require states to submit implementation plans. The court described
the EPA plan as an effort to compensate for lack of authority by requiring states to enact
appropriate regulations pursuant to a federal plan. Examining 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(1)
(1970), which requires, prior to federal action against a violator of an applicable implementation plan, notices to the polluter and the state in which the pollution occurs, the court
concluded that if Congress intended to authorize the Administrator to move against an
individual by requiring states to take action a second notice to the individual would be
superfluous. The court also noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(2) (1970) provides a separate
procedure for direct federal enforcement of a plan when the Administrator determines that
widespread violations are occurring. The court reasoned that if Congress intended the Administrator to force states to adopt and enforce adequate air pollution control regulations, the
separate provisions of this section would be meaningless.
54. The Court cited statements made during congressional debates suggesting that
Congress did intend to authorize the Administrator to force states to administer federallypromulgated programs. See statement of Congressman Staggers, note 10 supra.
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could regulate state-operated sources of pollution.55 Addressing the
EPA regulation requiring states to refuse to register vehicles failing
to meet federal standards, the court determined that this regulation
was a valid exercise of congressional power to prescribe the "rule by
which commerce is to be governed."5 The court analogized to prohibitions against unsafe railroad equipment and emphasized that the
EPA merely was requiring modifications of a "traditional" state
activity with no added state expenditures. The court then rejected
the EPA regulations requiring states to establish vehicle inspection
and retrofit programs as unauthorized attempts under the commerce power to substitute compelled state regulation for permissable federal regulation. The court cited both the Supreme Court's
acknowledgement in Wirtz that limits on the federal commerce
power are adequate to prevent drastic interference with state sovereignty, 57 and the Court's statement in Fry that the Economic Stabilization Act intruded even less upon state sovereignty than the minimum wage law in Wirtz1 as evidence that state sovereignty is of
some relevance when federal commerce power is exercised. The
court recognized that the Third Circuit in Pennsylvaniainterpreted
Wirtz to hold that state sovereignty does not impose a limit on
federal commerce power, but noted that Pennsylvania was decided
prior to the Supreme Court's explanation of Wirtz in Fry. The court
also adverted to the Supreme Court's statement in Fry that the
tenth amendment is not without significance. Granting that the
Supreme Court has yet to reconcile the federal commerce power and
the tenth amendment, the court suggested that the tenth amendment may prevent congressional regulation of commerce in a manner that drastically interferes with state sovereignty. Noting that
while the tenth amendment provides an additional ground for its
holding, and emphasizing the Wirtz and Fry suggestion that federal
commerce power is not limitless, the court concluded that the instant regulations are clearly massive intrusions upon state sovereignty that exceed the federal commerce power.59
55. The court affirmed the regulations requiring petitioners to purchase additional
buses and create reversible bus lanes, finding state-owned bus systems and highways analogous to the railway system in California. 521 F.2d at 989.
56. Id. at 991 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824)).
57. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
58. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
59. Since the substance of the inspection and retrofit regulations was not invalidated,
the court considered and rejected petitioner's claim that the programs were arbitrary and
capricious. 521 F.2d at 996. The court, however, did conclude that the regulations
requiring bicycle lanes were without adequate factual support. Id. at 997. Finally, the court
recognized that the District of Columbia is in a different position than states concerning
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IV.

COMMENT

The instant decision appears to be the first in recent times to
invalidate an exercise of federal commerce power because of intrusion upon state sovereignty. Aptly noting that the Supreme Court
itself, in Wirtz and Fry, never refused to consider the impact of a
federal regulation upon the ability of a state to function in the
federal system, the court reaches the eminently logical conclusion
that while a showing of interference with state sovereignty per se
will not defeat an otherwise valid exercise of federal commerce
power, a point does exist on a commerce power continuum beyond
which state sovereignty is so seriously impaired that the exercise of
the power becomes unconstitutional. Although acknowledgement of
this limitation does not necessarily resurrect the antiquated distinction drawn in the federal tax cases between "proprietary" and "governmental" state functions," the limitation affirms Justice Frankfurter's observation in New York v. United States that the vitality
of the federal system requires protection of certain state functions
intrinsically related to a state's sovereign status." Although the
court is unclear concerning the extent to which the tenth amendment is central to its holding, the instant decision indicates that the
tenth amendment is more than a truism .12 The court buttressed its
invalidation of the inspection and retrofit regulations by citation to
the Supreme Court's statement in Fry that the tenth amendment
may prevent Congress from exercising power in a fashion that impairs a state's ability to function in the federal system. 3 The court
quite properly hesitated to impart too much significance to this
statement, and concluded that although the Supreme Court has yet
to reconcile the federal commerce power and the tenth amendment,
the tenth amendment "may" prevent Congress from selecting methods of regulating commerce that "drastically" interfere with state
sovereignty. Nevertheless, the instant decision suggests that the
tenth amendment may be a source of affirmative constitutional
rights that a state, in its sovereign capacity, may assert against the
exercise of federal power, independent of the inherent limitations on
that power, in the same fashion that an individual may assert first
immunity from federal regulation, but treated the District as a state on the basis of its
treatment in the Clean Air Act and the need for uniform implementation of air quality

standards. Id. at 995.
60.
61.

See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
See text accompanying note 24 supra.

62. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
63. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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or fifth amendment rights. 4
Significantly, the instant decision also explores the distinction,
noted in Brown and Maryland but apparently overlooked in
Pennsylvania, between federal regulation of a particular activity,
whether conducted by a state or an individual, and federal regulation of that activity by compelling states to exercise their police
powers. 5 In the Supreme Court's California, Wirtz, and Fry analyses the Court first examined the activity itself to determine
whether it could be federally regulated. Once the interstate commerce nexus was established and a determination was made that
state sovereignty was not impaired drastically, the regulation was
sustained regardless of the character of the party conducting the
activity. The issue in Pennsylvania and the instant case is not
whether the particular activity-air pollution-is subject to federal
regulation, as it quite obviously is, but whether a particular source
of pollution-automobile emissions-can be classifed as state activity that Congress, under the Wirtz rationale, may regulate by compelling states to take remedial action. Viewed in this context, the
Third Circuit's dismissal as irrelevant the contention that highways, unlike railroads, are uniquely state entities is itself irrelevant
because highways themselves are not the source of pollution. While
the Third Circuit hints that automobiles are sufficiently related to
an overall state-operated transportation system to bring them
within the reach of Wirtz," the instant court takes the sounder
position that automobile emissions involve private activity that the
federal government may not regulate by utilizing state police power.
Thus the court limits the Wirtz holding to those situations in which
the activity regulated specifically is conducted by a state and not
merely subject to state regulation. In so doing, the instant court
poses the question whether federal regulations that directly interfere
with state police powers are "drastic" invasions of state sovereignty
exceeding the Wirtz limitations on the commerce clause, or whether
police powers are so fundamentally different from other sovereign
state powers that they deserve affirmative constitutional protection
under the tenth amendment.
By focusing on the critical question of the character of automo64. Justice Rehnquist took this position in his Fry dissent:
. . the State is not simply asserting an absence of congressional legislative authority,
but rather is asserting an affirmative constitutional right, inherent in its capacity as a
State, to be free from congressionally asserted authority.
421 U.S. 542, 553 (1975).
65. See 521 F.2d at 994 n.27.
66. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
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bile emissions, the instant court emphasizes a serious weakness in
federal efforts to control air pollution. Most air pollution is caused
by private automobiles. 7 Congress can clearly regulate any and all
sources of air pollution; a direct federal effort to enforce automobile
emission controls against individual owners, however, would require
a massive expenditure of federal resources. This is clearly the type
of program Congress sought to avoid by placing primary responsibility for achievement of national air quality standards on the states.68
Yet, the instant decision, by interpreting the Constitution to deny
Congress the power to force states to assume this responsibility in
instances of state inaction, requires that the Administrator undertake the direct federal actions necessary to meet the national air
quality goals mandated by Congress in the Clean Air Act. The instant decision, therefore, does not augur well for federal air pollution
control programs. It forces the Administrator to expend considerable federal monies to regulate an activity that clearly may be controlled more efficiently at the local level, and forces Congress to
make the difficult decision whether the achievement of clean air is
worth the additional expenditures of federal resources that the instant decision leaves as the only alternative to state inaction.
ROBERT

D. BuTTERs

Securities Law-Securities Fraud-Proof of
Reliance Is Unnecessary in Open Market
Transactions Under 10b-5
I.

FACTS AND HOLDINGS

Prompted by the financial difficulties of the Ampex Corporation in 1972,' several investors' in Ampex brought a class action
67. See Comment, Air Pollution:The Problem of Motor Vehicle Emissions, 3 CONN. L.
REv. 178 (1970).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(a) (1970) provides: "Each State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State

1. In Ampex's 1970 annual report (issued May 2, 1970) the corporation reported a $12
million profit. By January, 1972, the corporation estimated $40 million losses for fiscal 1972,
by March the estimate of losses had increased to $80 million and the annual report (issued
August 3, 1972) reported a $90 million loss. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 894 (9th Cir.
1975).
2. The named plaintiff represented a class of investors who had purchased Ampex stock
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against the corporation, its officers, and its independent auditor3 for
damages suffered from purchasing securities over a two-year period
during which Ampex had published numerous allegedly misleading
corporate documents,4 inflating the market price of those securities
in violation of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange
Act 5 and Rule 10b-51 promulgated under that Act. Defendants 7 contended that, in light of the extended period of time and the numerous documents involved, the class was certified improperly8 because
between May 1970 and August 1972. Involved were some 120,000 transactions and some
21,000,000 shares of stock. Id. at 901.
3. The independent auditor for the Ampex Corporation was Touche Ross & Co.
4. Plaintiffs claimed that 45 documents, including two annual reports, six quarterly
reports, and various press releases and SEC filings inflated the market price because the
documents:
(a) overstated earnings, (b) overstated the value of inventories and other assets, (c)
buried expense items and other costs incurred for research and development in inventory, (d) misrepresented the companies' current ratio, (e) failed to establish adequate
reserves for receivables, (f) failed to write off certain assets, (g) failed to account for the
proposed discontinuation of certain product lines, [and] (h) misrepresented Ampex's
prospects for future earnings.
524 F.2d at 902.
5. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1970)
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
7. Defendants Ampex Corporation and Touche Ross & Co. were excluded from this
appeal. They did not join the individual defendants in requesting reconsideration of the order
conditionally certifying the class before they had filed notices of appeal. The District Court
therefore excluded both Ampex and Touche Ross from the interlocutory appeal. 524 F.2d at
894-95 n.4; see note 8 infra.
8. The instant court also decided that an order conditionally certifying a class is not a
final order and is thus not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). With this decision the
Ninth Circuit joined the Sixth Circuit, Walsh v. Detroit, 412 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1969), and
the Seventh Circuit, Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 469 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1972),
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individual questions of reliance' predominated over any common
questions of law or fact, 10 and therefore the class-action requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) (3)" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were not met. Plaintiffs claimed that individual questions of
reliance were not an element of a 10b-5 cause of action and that the
class had been certified properly. The trial court found that the
proposed class met the requirements of Rule 23 and conditionally
certified the class." On appeal, 3 the Ninth Circuit Court of Apin holding that a class certification order is not appealable under § 1291. The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949),
allowed the circuit courts to accept appeals from certain nonfinal orders:
* * . which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated.
337 U.S. at 546.
Under Cohen, the Second Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967) (Eisen I), and the Ninth Circuit in Weingartner v. Union
Oil Co., 431 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1970), have allowed appeals from orders denying class certification because such an order effectively would end the litigation. In not allowing an appeal of
right of an order certifying a class, the court stressed that such an order does not end the
litigation. Thus the court rejected defendants' argument, accepted by the Second Circuit in
Herbst v. ITT, 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir 1974), that denying an appeal promotes costly litigation,
treats defendants and plaintiffs differently, subjects defendants to potentially limitless liability and therefore forces them to settle class action suits. See Note, Class Action Certification
Orders:An Argument for the Defendant'sRight to Appeal, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 621 (1974).
After determining that the certification order was not appealable under § 1291, the court
considered the merits of the certification because an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970)
had been granted. As indicated in note 7 supra, not all defendants were allowed to join in
this appeal.
9. The court also rejected defendants' argument that the question of damages predominated over any common questions of law or fact. The court stated that the trial judge can
handle any such conflicts in the damages area during the trial by the use of sub-classes if
that becomes necessary. 524 F.2d at 899 n.15.
10. Defendants also had urged that no common questions of law or fact existed because
plaintiffs had purchased at different times and the alleged misrepresentations and omissions
were contained in documents published throughout the two-year period in dispute. In rejecting this contention, the court stressed that the complaint alleged a common course of deceptive conduct and that this common course of conduct supplied the requisite common question
of law or fact. 524 F.2d at 902.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) reads, in appropriate parts:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy.
12. In clarifying its holding in In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir.
1974), the court held that while it is impermissible to certify an improper class on the basis
of a speculative possibility that the class may later meet the requirements of proper certification, the trial court judge is required only to review the material before him to determine if
the requirements appear to be met at that time.
13. The appeal was granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). See note 8 supra.
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peals, held, affirmed. A common question of law sufficient to sustain a 10b-5 class action exists when investors claim that deceptive
practices inflated the price of stock they purchased on the open
market; proof of individual reliance on specific omissions is irrelevant. A defendant, however, can disprove causation by showing that
the deception was not material, that an insufficient number of
investors relied on the deception to create the inflated market price,
or that the investors knew of the misrepresentation and purchased
despite such knowledge. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir.
1975).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court's decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States" is the logical starting point in understanding the
current confusion over the role of reliance in 10b-5 actions. While
prior to this decision, cases'" and commentators'" had questioned the
necessity of proving reliance, Affiliated Ute provided a clear break
from the reliance requirement in cases of material omissions. In
Affiliated Ute, terminated Ute Indians" formed the Ute Distribution Corporation (UDC)8 to manage the distribution of tribal assets.'9 UDC issued stock to each terminated Ute and agreed with the
First Security Bank of Utah to have the bank serve as transfer agent
for the individual terminated Utes. During a five-year period the
bank employees responsible for the UDC stock developed a nonIndian resale market for the securities, but did not inform the individual shareholders of the existence of this secondary market. In
upholding the individual shareholders' complaint under 10b-5 the
Court concluded:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose,
positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary
14. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
15. See, e.g., Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950
(1970); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
16. See, e.g., 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITrEs LAw-FRAUD: SEC RULE 10b-5 § 8.6, at 212
(1967); Note, Reliance Under Rule 10b-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 72
COLUM. L. REv. 562 (1972).

17. The designation "terminated Ute" is used in this comment instead of the term

"mixed-blood." See 406 U.S. 128, 133 n.3 (1972).
18. The Ute Distrib. Corp. was formed under the Ute Partition Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 67777aa (1970).
19. The tribal assets consisted of cash and land, oil, gas, and mineral rights, and
unadjudicated and unliquidated claims against the government.
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is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor
20
might have considered them important in the making of this decision.

The Court held that once a plaintiff proves an obligation to disclose
information and a withholding of a material fact, he has established
the requisite causation.21 The underlying rationale for this approach
is that a plaintiff should not be required to prove that he relied on
2
that which he did not know existed. 1
After Affiliated Ute, the courts adopted a variety of responses
in an attempt to define the continued role of reliance in 10b-5 actions.n Generally these responses take one of three forms: (1) an
attempt to abolish completely the reliance requirement in all 10b-5
actions, (2) an attempt to interpret Affiliated Ute narrowly as applicable only to nondisclosure cases, or (3) an attempt to develop and
to implement a separate standard for cases in which the deception
caused an inflated price in open market transactions.
Illustrative of the cases in which the courts have indicated a
willingness to abolish the reliance requirement in all 10b-5 actions
is Allen Organ Co. v. North American Rockwell Corp. 4 In Allen
Organ the plaintiff agreed to purchase a debenture bond from the
defendant for the exclusive license rights in computer components
for musical instruments. The license rights, however, proved to be
not as valuable as initially believed. The plaintiff ultimately
brought a 10b-5 cause of action alleging that it had relied on material misstatements and omissions made by the defendant in entering into the transaction in question. The defendant asserted that
during negotiations to resolve the difficulties the plaintiff had
agreed in writing that it had not relied on the representations made
by defendant and thus the complaint should be dismissed. In refusing to dismiss the complaint the court concluded that proof of reliance was not required in 10b-5 actions.2 5 While the procedural
framework of the case, a preliminary motion to dismiss, may
weaken its precedential value, the court's willingness to extend the
20. 406 U.S. at 153-54.
21. In Affliliated Ute the Court stated: "This obligation to disclose and this withholding
of a material fact establish the requisite element of causation

....

"

406 U.S. at 154.

22. See note 48 infra and accompanying text.
23. See generally, Note, The Reliance Requirement in PrivateActions Under SEC Rule
lOb-5, 88 HARv. L. REv. 584 (1975).
24. 363 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
25. Id. at 1127. Specifically, the court stated:
Moreover, it is now well established that proof of reliance need not be shown in a Section
10(b) cause of action and causation is satisfied by a showing that the facts
misrepresentedor withheld are material.

.

.

. (emphasis added)
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holding of Affiliated Ute is unmistakable.21 Similarly, in Dorfman
v. First Boston Corp.,2 a retired school teacher and a family corporation sought to represent a class consisting of all persons who purchased Pennco Bonds after the publication of an offering circular
allegedly containing misrepresentations and omissions. The defendant challenged the validity of the class and introduced evidence
that Dorfman, a named representative, had not read the circular
and that the family corporation purchased the securities as a result
of independent research conducted by its president. Refusing to
dismiss the complaint, the court cited Affiliated Ute for the proposition that proof of reliance was unnecessary and held that consequently "there can be no conceivable reason for requiring proof of
reliance as a prerequisite for class membership. ' 28 Furthermore, the
court stated that the substantial common questions raised by the
allegations concerning the offering circular far outweighed the ques29
tions affecting only individual class members.
Other courts have restricted the holding of Affiliated Ute to
cases involving omissions. In Shapiro v. MerrillLynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc.,"'the defendants were underwriters for a Douglas
offering of convertible subordinated debentures. As underwriters,
they received confidential information that Douglas would revise its
earnings estimate downward, which they disclosed to some of their
customers before the information was released publicly. The plaintiff represented those investors who purchased on the national securities exchange3 prior to the disclosure of the less favorable earn26. Since the plaintiff alleged both reliance and materiality, the court's statements
concerning reliance could be characterized as dicta. Of interest is the fact that the plaintiff
did allege reliance indicating that counsel anticipated that it still was necessary to prove
reliance.
27. 62 F.R.D. 466 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
28. Id. at 471.
29. It is interesting to note that despite the expansiveness of the opinion, the court
relied on Affiliated Ute only to support its conclusion that proof of reliance is unnecessary in
omission cases. Id. Also adopting this expansive reading of Affiliated Ute is Davis v. Avco
Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1974). In Davis the plaintiff invested in a pyramid sales
scheme. To obtain money to invest in the venture, many investors borrowed money from the
defendant after being assured by the defendant of the soundness of the investment. The
defendant opposed class certification and contended that there would be different degrees of
reliance for each member of the class. The court interpreted Affiliated Ute as abolishing the
requirement of proving reliance under Rule 10b-5. In both Dorfman and Davis the facts may
qualify the courts' broad language. In those cases the plaintiffs alleged both omissions and
misrepresentations. It is possible to conclude that the court meant that proof of reliance is
unnecessary when misrepresentations and omissions are present in the same case.
30. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
31. The court also rejected defendants' contention that Affiliated Ute should be limited
to cases involving face-to-face transactions. 495 F.2d at 240.
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ings report. The court was careful to describe the conduct in question as conduct involving an omission, thus bringing it within the
Affiliated Ute holding that in such cases proof of reliance was unnecessary.32 Another decision narrowly interpreting Affiliated Ute is
Rochez Brothers,Inc. v. Rhoades.3 In Rochez, both the plaintiff and
the defendant were fifty percent shareholders in the corporation.
The plaintiff sold its stock in the corporation to the defendant, who
failed to disclose that he already had begun negotiations for the sale
of the corporation. Subsequently, the defendant sold the corporation for a significant profit. Characterizing the plaintiff's 10b-5
cause of action as an omissions case, the court concluded that
proof of reliance was not required. The court carefully noted, however, that proof of reliance had not been abolished in all 10b-5
actions. 4
Moreover, in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.," the court
frankly acknowledged that there were different standards of proof
in misrepresentation and omission cases. The Schlick minority
stockholders complained that Penn-Dixie gained control of Continental Steel Corporation and completed a merger agreement, which
provided an unfair exchange ratio, through a premerger proxy statement containing both omissions and misrepresentations. 3 The court
stated that a plaintiff must establish different elements of proof in
cases founded exclusively on either omissions or misrepresentations;
in a misrepresentation case the plaintiff must demonstrate that he
relied on the misrepresentation in question when he entered into the
transaction, while in an omissions case the plaintiff is not required
to prove reliance. 37 The court cited Affiliated Ute only for the proposition that proof of reliance is unnecessary in an omissions case."
32.

Since the plaintiff alleged he would not have purchased had he known of the

omission, the court concluded that even under pre-Affiliated Ute case law in the Second

Circuit the plaintiff had stated a valid cause of action. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965).

33. 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974).
34. Further, the court indicated that while proof of reliance is not necessary in an
omissions case, the defendant can overcome the presumption of causation by showing that
the plaintiff would not have changed his investment decision even if he had known of the
misrepresentation. The court interpreted Affiliated Ute as switching to the defendant the
burden of proving nonreliance. 491 F.2d at 410. For a general discussion of the applicability
of finding a rebuttable presumption see Note, The Reliance Requirement in PrivateActions
Under SEC Rule I0b-5, 88 HARv. L. Rev. 584, 600 (1975).

35.

507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974).

36. The plaintiffs alleged that the defective proxy statement failed to disclose the
manner in which Penn-Dixie had inflated the value of its shares at the expense of the acquired
Continental. 507 F.2d at 377.

37. Id. at 380-81.
38.

Id. Since the court found that the complaint included more than a claim of material
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The Second Circuit reviewed the holding and the rationale for
Affiliated Ute in Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen.3' There a conglomerate purchaser claimed that the seller's misrepresentations and omissions caused it to purchase the business. Describing Affiliated Ute
strictly as an omissions case, the court stated that in omission cases
proof of reliance is not required because it is impossible to prove. 0
The court reasoned, however, that this rationale does not apply in
a misrepresentation case since it is possible to demonstrate whether
the plaintiff relied on the alleged affirmative statement.' Reviewing
the facts of the case, the court concluded that the prime motivation
for the purchase came from facts that were not misrepresented.
Under this factual setting, the court held that the omissions were
not material. From this conclusion the court reasoned that the
plaintiff had failed to establish a cause of action because he had not
demonstrated sufficient reliance.
Finally, a number of cases hold that proof of reliance is unnecessary when deception is alleged to have inflated the price of stock
traded on the open market.4" In both Herbst v. IT 3 and ChrisCraft Industries, Inc. v. PiperAircraft Corp.," the Second Circuit
held that an individual shareholder does not have to prove reliance
once a misstatement is shown to be material. The justification for
this approach is that it is both impractical and difficult for shareholders to prove, in the aggregate, how they would have acted had
they known the whole truth. 5 Other courts have held that it is not
necessary to prove reliance in any open market situation. Thus, in
omissions or misrepresentations, proof of reliance was deemed unnecessary. In Reeder v.
Mastercraft Electron. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court also acknowledged that different standards of proof existed in misrepresentation and omission cases. The
court, after discussing Affiliated Ute, concluded that proof of reliance generally still is required in cases of misrepresentations.
39. 513 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3202 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975).
40. Id. at 239.
41. Id. A number of other recent cases have also concluded that Affiliated Ute does not
eliminate the necessity of proving reliance in misrepresentation cases. In Hickman v. Groesbeck, 389 F. Supp. 769, 776 (D. Utah 1974), the court, without mentioning Affiliated Ute,
held that a plaintiff must prove materiality, scienter, reliance, and causation in misrepresentation and omission cases. In Chelsea Associates v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp. 929, 939 (E.D.
Mich. 1974), afl'd, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,374 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 1975), the court noted
that in 10b-5 cases the plaintiff must prove materiality and, in cases of false representations,
reliance on the alleged deceptive practice.
42. See generally Note, Reliance Under Rule 10b-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor"
Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1972).
43. 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir. 1974).
44. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). Both Herbst and ChrisCraft can be distinguished from the instant case since the deception in those cases took place
in the context of an exchange offer.
45. 495 F.2d at 1316.
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Werfel v. Kramarsky,6 the plaintiff alleged that from 1968 to 1970
the defendants, pursuant to a common scheme, had disseminated
annual and quarterly reports, financial and proxy statements that
falsely represented the corporation's growth and earnings situation. In fact, the company experienced $13,000,000 losses and trading of its stock was suspended in 1970. The court held that the
plaintiff need not prove reliance and supported its conclusion by
adopting the "indirect reliance" doctrine." That approach stresses
that although the investor need not prove reliance on the particular
misrepresentation in question, he has relied on the market price,
8
which is presumed to be affected by the misrepresentation.1
Following Affiliated Ute, the federal courts have not adopted a
common approach in describing the role of reliance in 10b-5 cases.
Some courts have interpreted Affiliated Ute as applicable only to
omission cases, others have expanded Affiliated Ute to all 10b-5
cases, still others have adopted an entirely different approach to
cases involving open market transactions. As evidenced by the cases
discussed above, the approach taken by a particular court ultimately may affect not only an individual plaintiff's recovery, but
also whether a class action can be maintained. When reliance must
be proved, individual questions of reliance may be found to predominate over common questions of law or fact among the class, and
thus the class action will be dismissed.

III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

Although determining that an order certifying a class is not
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 4" the court nevertheless held
that dismissal was not mandated.50 Upholding the class certification, the court rejected defendants' contentions that individual
questions of reliance predominated over common questions of law
or fact. The court found that despite varying individual facts, a
46. 61 F.R.D. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
47. Id. at 681. See also Reeder v. Mastercraft Electron. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).

48.

The clearest explanation of the indirect reliance doctrine is found in Professor

Bromberg's treatise on securities laws. He states:

If the misstatement does not come to plaintiff's attention, as can easily happen in open
market trades, it would be meaningless to demand reliance. It would also be unfair, since

an investor who trades with reference to market price and conditions may be affected
by the misstatement although he never hears of it. This difficulty might be overcome
by saying that he has relied indirectly.
2 A. BROMBERG, SECURriEs LAw-FRAuD: SEC RULE 10b-5 § 8.6, at 212 (1967).
49.

See note 8 supra.

50.

524 F.2d at 900.
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common question of law existed as to defendants' alleged misconduct over the entire period. Furthermore, the court stated that proof
of individual reliance was unnecessary. To support this conclusion,
the court advanced two lines of analysis. First, the court characterized the alleged misconduct as consisting of material omissions,
and, applying the Affiliated Ute rule, stated that proof of reliance
is not required in such cases. 5' Secondly, the court described the
alleged misconduct as "deception inflating the price of stock traded
in the open market" 52 and, citing Herbst and Chris-Craft, again
concluded that proof of reliance was unnecessary." Following this
approach the court stated that the purpose of reliance is to establish
the causal link between the defendant's wrongdoing and the plaintiff's loss. In the open market situation, the appropriate causal link
is established by proof of purchase and of the materiality of the
misrepresentations. 4 Materiality establishes that some market
traders relied on the misstatements and, therefore, -that the market
price was inflated. Subsequent traders, relying on this inflated
price, purchased the security and completed the causal link between
the misconduct and the loss. Furthermore, characterizing the 10b-5
action as compensatory, the instant court held that once the plaintiff establishes the materiality of the misrepresentation, the burden
of disproving the prima facie case of causation shifts to the defendant.5 The court then established a twofold test for rebutting the
prima facie case of causation:
(1) by disproving materiality or by proving that, despite materiality, an insufficient number of traders relied to inflate the price; and (2) by proving that
an individual plaintiff purchased despite knowledge of the falsity of a representation, or that he would have, had he known of it."

In support of shifting the burden of proof, the court stated that an
investor is entitled to rely on the supposition that the market price
has been validly set and has not been artificially inflated. 57 The
court concluded that to protect the investor, and therefore further
51. Id. at 905.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See note 48 supra.
55. 524 F.2d at 906. Other courts have also attempted to formulate approaches under
which the defendant can rebut the presumption of reliance. In Kesler v. Hynes & Howes Real
Estate, 66 F.R.D. 43 (S.D. Iowa 1975), the court interpreted Affiliated Ute as holding that,
in nondisclosure cases, materiality gives rise to a presumption of reliance. Under this analysis
the defendant can rebut the presumption by showing the plaintiff's nonreliance. See note 34
supra and accompanying text.
56. 524 F.2d at 906.
57. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
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the purposes of the securities laws, proof of actual reliance by the
plaintiff is superfluous. 8 Characterizing the conduct in the instant
case as omissions, and since the transactions involved securities
traded on the open market, the Ninth Circuit ruled that proof of
reliance was unnecessary.
IV.

COMMENT

With this decision, the Ninth Circuit has indicated a willingness to abolish the requirement of proving reliance in all 10b-5 actions." The two rationales advanced by the court supporting this
conclusion" as well as its proposed test for rebutting causation, pose
several difficulties. First, the court's attempt to classify the deception in the instant case as "omissions" appears conceptually unsound. By characterizing as omissions conduct that included overstating earnings, overstating the value of inventory and assets, misrepresenting profits for future earnings, and misrepresenting the
company's current ratio, the court has stretched the concept of
omission to the extent that it conceivably includes all misconduct
under 10b-5. Analysis of the plaintiffs' claims"1 suggests that they
can be described more accurately as involving both omissions and
misrepresentations. The distinction is of more than semantic difference. By characterizing all 10b-5 conduct as omissions, the court is
able to abolish effectively the reliance requirement without extending the holding of Affiliated Ute. The Supreme Court was careful
in Affiliated Ute to restrict its holding to omission cases, " in which
the reliance requirement was eliminated because it presented an
impossible proof burden. As numerous courts" and commentators 4
have concluded, these same proof problems do not exist in misrepresentation cases. As discussed below,"5 the distinction between omissions and misrepresentations becomes particularly important in
implementing the court's own standard for disproving causation.
The court's analysis of the role of reliance in open market transactions, however, is consonant with existing case law.66 In abolishing
the reliance requirement in this setting, the court apparently ac58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

524 F.2d at 908.
See notes 24-31 supra.
See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text.
See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 14-21 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 35-41 supra and accompanying text.
See note 23 supra.
See notes 69-74 infra.
See notes 42-48 supra.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:287

cepted the indirect reliance doctrine, 7 which eliminates the requirement of proving reliance in open market transactions because, while
proof of reliance might be possible, it would restrict recovery and
frustrate the purposes of the securities law. Both Affiliated Ute and
the indirect reliance doctrine presume that purchasers bought stock
in reliance on the representations and thus inflated the market
price. Therefore, subsequent purchasers who bought in reliance on
the inflated price are allowed to recover to further the protective
purposes of the securities law.68
After developing two separate rationales for not requiring proof
of reliance, the court formulated a twofold approach by which defendants can disprove causation. 9 By allowing a defendant to disprove causation through proof that a sufficient number of investors
did not rely on the misrepresentations to inflate the market price,
the court preserves, to a limited extent, the role of reliance in open
market transactions. Retention of the reliance requirement in this
form substantiates the above analysis that reliance is presumed in
open market transactions not because it is impossible to demonstrate, but because the purposes of the securities laws are better
served thereby. If reliance could not be proved or disproved, the
proferred defense would have little meaning. It would seem, however, that this defense may be available only in misrepresentation
cases. If the market price were affected by omissions, the defense
would appear to be unavailable under the Affiliated Ute doctrine.
Therefore it becomes important for the court to analyze correctly
the case as either one of omission or misrepresentation. If these two
concepts are merged, as in the instant case, the defense may well
be illusory. Further, in face-to-face transactions, where the misconduct involves omissions and misrepresentations, the defendant may
be able to demonstrate that the misrepresentations predominate.
This could suggest that the omissions were not material and the
plaintiff would then be required to prove reliance on the misrepresentations. 0
The court's second method of disproving causation 71 also presents some conceptual problems. In the context of this case, a class
action involving purchases made on the open market, the defense
appears irrelevant. Plaintiffs obviously will select class representa67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See note 48 supra.
524 F.2d at 907.
Id. at 906.
See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
See text accompanying note 56 supra.
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tives who will be immune from attack on this ground. If the test is
directed primarily to situations involving face-to-face transactions,
it appears, unjustifiably,12 to switch the burden of proof to a defendant in misrepresentation cases.13 Equally puzzling is the second
half of this proposed method of disproving causation, phrased ambiguously at best. 4 The court may be suggesting that in omission
cases the defendant can defeat causation by proving that the plaintiff would not have relied on the omission had he known it existed.
This presents the same kind of impossible proof burden properly
rejected by the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute.
The court's attempt to blur the distinctions between misrepresentations and omissions creates confusion in the application of the
court's proposed method of disproving causation. In transactions on
the open market, however, the court's abolition of the necessity of
proving reliance and its adoption of the indirect reliance doctrine is
a logical implementation of the purposes underlying the securities
laws. The court's attempt to demonstrate methods for defendants
to disprove causation, while suffering in places from problems of
clarity and consistency, is an important first step in developing
realistic standards of proof in 10b-5 cases. The apparent willingness
of the court to consider alternative methods for defendants to disprove causation suggests a likelihood that future cases will improve
and refine the court's own suggested methods.
WALTER

T. ECCARD

72. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
73. See text accompanying note 56 supra.The wording gives rise to this interpretation.
The court states that a defendant, to rebut causation, can show that a plaintiff purchased
"despite knowledge of the falsity of a representation." Since, throughout the opinion, the
court appears to use the words omission and misrepresentation interchangeably, exact analysis is difficult. If, however, the court is using misrepresentation in its traditional sense, it
appears the burden of proof has been switched to the defendant.
74. The court's wording also lends itself to the interpretation that individuals who
would have purchased, but did not purchase, have standing in a lob-5 cause of action. While
this is a possible grammatical construction, in light of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugs,
421 U.S. 723 (1975), it does not seem plausible that the court intended this alternative
interpretation.

